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Abstract
In recent work, MacFarlane [] and Egan et al. [] have used new observations
about epistemic modals to motivate radical new semantic analyses. MacFar-
lane introduces a triple-indexed semantics which makes sentences with epistemic
modals not just sensitive to the context of utterance and an index of evaluation
but also to a context of assessment. Egan et al. propose that epistemically modal-
ized sentences do not express standard propositions but functions from individ-
uals to propositions, something like centered propositions. We will argue that
these moves are not only problematic but also unnecessary.
 The Standard Theory (Kratzer)
() a. Every car must be inspected.
b. In view of what the laws are, every car must be inspected.
() a. That coin might have landed heads.
b. In view of what the laws of physics provide, that coin might have landed
heads.
() a. Jackl might be the murderer.
b. In view of what is known, Jackl might be the murderer.
Kratzer’s picture [, , ]:
• Modals are quantiﬁers over possible worlds.
• Possibility modals are existential quantiﬁers, necessity modals are universal
quantiﬁers. They are duals of each other.
• Modals quantify over the worlds given by a background such as “in view of
what the laws are” (i.e. the worlds compatible with what the laws are in the
evaluation world).
• The “ambiguity” between epistemic modals and deontic modals (and others) is
really context-dependency.
“Might” Made Right 
() Jmight φKc,i =  iﬀ ∃w0 ∈ fc(i) : JφKc,<w0,ti> = .
Jmust φKc,i =  iﬀ ∀w0 ∈ fc(i) : JφKc,<w0,ti> = .
Comments: We work with a standard doubly-indexed semantics where we as-
sign semantic values relative to a context of utterance c and an index of eval-
uation i. We assume that the index consists at least of a pair of an evalua-
tion world and an evaluation time. For the most part, we will ignore time-
dependency. fc is a function supplied by the context assigning to the evalu-
ation world wi and the evaluation time ti a set of accessible worlds. We get
an epistemic reading of the modal when fc is that function that assigns to any
index the set of worlds compatible with “what is known” in wi at ti. But what
does “what is known” mean?
Under one interpretation of “what is known”, we get solipsistic readings of epistemic
modals. Kratzer []:
If epistemic interpretations of modals are relativized to the evidence
available in the utterance situation, diﬀerent utterances of one and the
same sentence involving such a modal might express diﬀerent proposi-
tions. Let us look at an example:
Suppose a man is approaching both of us. You are standing over there. I
am further away. I can only see the bare outlines of the man, in view of
my evidence, the person approaching may be Fred. You know better. In
view of your evidence, it cannot possibly be Fred, it must be Martin. If
this is so, my utterance of () and your utterance of () are both true.
() The person approaching might be Fred.
() The person approaching cannot be Fred.
Had I uttered () and you (), both our utterances would have been false.
We would get this solipsistic interpretation if fc assigns the worlds compatible with
what the speaker of c knows in wi. We will use s to refer to the speaker of c and will
write fs for a solipsistic knowledge base.
 The Extended Standard Theory
Kratzer is not committed to the claim that epistemic modals are always to be under-
stood solipsistically. There is a lot of suitable vagueness and ﬂexibility in the expres-
sion “what is known”. There is in fact an entirely independent tradition of exploring
what the range of epistemic readings is.
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. Hacking, Teller, DeRose
DeRose [] presents a number of variations built around the following scenario:
() John has some symptoms indicative of cancer. John’s doctor decides to run
a “ﬁltering” test, which has two possible results: If the results are “negative”,
then cancer is conclusively ruled out; if the results are “positive”, then John
might, but also might not, have cancer and further tests will have to be run.
() DR’ C T C A (CTC-A)
a. Bill: “I have heard John has cancer. Is it true?”
Jane, John’s wife: “It’s possible that John has cancer. He has some of the
symptoms. But it’s by no means certain that he’s got it. They’ve run a
test on him which may rule cancer out, but they won’t tell us the results
of the test until tomorrow.”
b. John’s doctor, to a colleague: “It’s impossible that John has cancer, so we
should start planning tests for other diseases.”
() DR’ C T C B (CTC-B)
Bill: “I’ve heard that John may have cancer. Is that possible?”
Jane: “Idon’tknowwhetheritispossiblethatJohnhascancer; onlythedoctors
know. I’ll ﬁnd that out tomorrow when the results of the test are revealed.”
Crucial: Jane can truthfully say that she doesn’t know whether it is possible that John
has cancer, which entails that for all she knows, it might not be possible, even though
clearly it is compatible with everything that she knows that he has cancer. So, this use
of possible must be sensitive to more than Jane’s knowledge state.
() DR’ P – F V
it is possible that p is true in world w iﬀ no member of the relevant community
knows in w that p is false. (DeRose borrowed this idea from Hacking []).
Flexibility: in CTC-A, the relevant community is Jane (and possibly Bill); in CTC-
B, it is a somewhat larger group of people that includes John’s doctors. (DeRose
attributes the idea of F   R C to Teller []).
We will reformulate the proposal as one about might as follows:
() Jmight φKc,i =  iﬀ ∀x ∈ Gc : ∃w0 ∈ fx(i) : JφKc,<w0,ti> = .
Here, Gc is the contextually supplied group (typically including the speaker).
fx delivers the set of worlds compatible with what x knows.
Note: This semantics does not reduce to the Kratzer-schema: there is not a single
modal base which is checked for compatibility with φ. The semantics iterates over
the knowledge bases of the individual members of Gc.
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. More Objectivity
A wrinkle: sometimes it seems that facts not in the possession of anyone in the
relevant community count for the truth of an epistemic modal.
() H’ S S C
Imagine a salvage crew searching for a ship that sank a long time ago. The
mate of the salvage ship works from an old log, makes some mistakes in his
calculations, and concludes that the wreck may be in a certain bay. It is
possible, he says, that the hulk is in these waters. No one knows anything
to the contrary. But in fact, as it turns out later, it simply was not possible
for the vessel to be in that bay; more careful examination of the log shows
that the boat must have gone down at least thirty miles further south. The
mate said something false when he said, “It is possible that we shall ﬁnd the
treasure here,” but the falsehood did not arise from what anyone actually
knew at the time. [].
() “Why was the mate speaking falsely when he said, “It is possible that the hulk
is here”? Because one could have found out from the data that the wreck took
place a good deal further south.” (Hacking)
() DR’ C T C B (CTC-B)
a. In this case, the test has been run, but not even the doctor knows the
results of the test. A computer has calculated the results and printed
them. A hospital employee has taken the printout and, without read-
ing it, placed it in a sealed envelope. The policy of the hospital is that
the patient should be the ﬁrst to learn the results. Jane has made an
appointment to pick up the results tomorrow. She knows that the en-
velope with the results has been generated and that nobody knows what
the results are.
b. Jane to Bill: “I don’t yet know whether it’s possible that John has cancer.
I’m going to ﬁnd that out tomorrow when the results of the test are
revealed.”
() DR’ P – S  F V
it is possible that p is true in world w iﬀ
(i) no member of the relevant community knows in w that p is false,
(ii) there is no relevant way in which members of the relevant community
can come to know that p is false.
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. Complaints
WepresenttwowaysinwhichDeRose’sproposalstillseemstofallshortofperfection.
.. Expectant Fathers, Drawn Curtains, etc.
() T’ E F C
At the time of writing I am an expectant father, and one will grant that I
speak truly when I say, “It is possible that my child will be a boy,” and “It
is possible that my child will be a girl.” Most readers are probably informed
here for the ﬁrst time that there is a practicable, in fact quite easy test which
will establish the sex of my expected child. ...On Hacking’s deﬁnition one
of my two statements must be false. But I submit that they are both true,
and that our judgment that they are true is not aﬀected by knowledge that a
test for sex is available before birth. The doting grandmother who agonizes,
“It’s possible it will be a boy, it’s possible it will be a girl. Should I buy blue or
pink?” is not shown by the availability of the test to have said anything false.
Norwillgrandmotherswholearnaboutthetestabandonsuchlocutions. []
() G’ R B  C C
Youcometomyoﬃceoneafternoon. Thecurtainsaredrawn. Wehaveanice
chat, and you are about to head home. I have not been outside since early
morning, but the forecast was for a % chance of rain. In such a situation,
it seems perfectly acceptable for me to say before you leave It might be raining
out. What does [DeRose] predict? Well, that all depends on condition (ii).
What counts as a relevant way is supposed to be supplied by context. But
it is hard to imagine that the context just described is a context in which
opening the curtains does not count as a relevant way of ﬁnding out the fact
of the matter about the current weather. If that is so, then I have not only
said something inappropriate by saying It might be raining. According to
[DeRose], I have said something false. And this is counter-intuitive. [].
Problem #: In these cases, there seem to be “relevant ways in which members of
the relevant community can come to know that p is false”, but nevertheless we can
truthfully say might p. In other words, unless the application of “relevant way of
coming to know” gets tailor-made, the analysis is wrong.
.. Distributed Knowledge
Consider a variant of DeRose’s Cancer Test Case. Here, two doctors have run two
diﬀerent tests, but they have not communicated with each other. Everyone, the
doctors and John and his wife, will come together on Monday to compare results
and decide on what to do next. As it happens, the two tests together rule out cancer.
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Even though Jane knows that nobody yet knows whether John has cancer, she can
say:
() We don’t know whether it is possible that John has cancer. The doctors
haven’t compared their results yet.
Problem#: Againitseemsthatknowledgenotinthepossessionofanyagentmatters
to truth of an epistemic possibility claim. But here it is knowledge that is already
present in the group, but in a “distributed” way. Perhaps, we should make space for
that in the analysis.
. What Do We Know?
Our proposal to amend the Standard Theory has two parts:
. base the semantics of might-statements in the D K of a
group G (solving Problem #)
. treat certain coherent bodies of evidence (computer printouts, ship logs, ...)
as potentially part of G (solving Problem #)
.. Notions of Group Knowledge
We can distinguish several diﬀerent notions of group knowledge.
. A very strict notion is   which requires that something (p)
is known by G only if everyone in G (i) knows p and (ii) knows that everyone
else in G knows p too and (iii) knows that everyone else in G knows that
everyone else in G knows p and ....
. A somewhat looser notion is   which merely requires that ev-
eryone in G knows it, without the additional mutual knowledge conditions.
. A yet looser notion is   which just requires that if all
the knowledge in the group is pooled, the group would know.
At the level of knowledge sets (sets of worlds compatible with one’s knowledge), we
can deﬁne:
() For each member x of a group G, we have the set of worlds fx(w) compatible
with what x knows in w.
() EG(w) =
S
x∈G fx(w) (the union of what the x’s consider possible)
⇒ ﬁrm knowledge in G
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() DG(w) =
T
x∈G fx(w) (the intersection of what the x’s consider possible)
⇒ distributed knowledge in G
Note: the weaker a notion of group knowledge we employ, the more things a group
knows, the smaller the set of worls compatible with the group’s knowledge gets,
and thus the stronger an epistemic possibility statement becomes! [PICTURE ON
BLACKBOARD]
() [BeginningofabrainstormsessionamongsomededicatedmembersofMIT’s
Modality Lab:] What do we know about epistemic modals?
() [Comment of a / widow on NPR, //:] We knew more than is
being owned up to. But nobody put the pieces together.
Our proposal: epistemic might is interpreted with respect to the distributed knowl-
edge of the relevant group.
() O S  ‘’
Jmight φKc,i =  iﬀ ∃w0 ∈
T
x∈Gc fx(w) : JφKc,<w0,ti> = 
Note: the solipsistic reading is the special case where Gc = {s}. So, our semantics
covers both the solipsistic reading and the group-based readings. Context determines
the extent of Gc.
.. Bodies of Evidence
What about Problem #? What is the diﬀerence between sealed computer printouts
or ship’s logs on the one hand and possible intra-uterine tests or looking behind the
curtains on the other hand?
Our proposal: the evidence contained in computer printouts or ship’s logs are treated
as honorary individual members of the group G. Directly looking at the facts is a way
of ﬁnding out what’s going on but is not thought of as a body of evidence.
 Compare this to the conceptualization behind systems of   in certain languages
[, , ]: direct visual experience is distinguished from information encoded in documents or reported
by other people. The latter are marked by  or  markers.
Our idea connects to work where epistemic modals are claimed to be evidential markers, for example
Westmoreland[]. Itseemscleartousthatepistemicmodalsdonotbehaveexactlylikeevidentialmarkers,
see Faller [] for arguments, but at the same time they seem to combine a standard modal semantics with
constraints about what kind evidence they are sensitive to.
(i) [Looking out the window at the pouring rain:]
??It must be raining.
(ii) [Looking at people coming in with wet umbrellas:]
It must be raining.




[A]s far as I can tell, ordinary people evaluate present tense claims of
epistemic modality as true or false by testing the claim against their own
perspective. So, for example suppose Angela doesn’t know whether Bill
is alive or dead. Angela says Bill might be dead. Cornelius knows Bill
is alive. There is a tendency for Cornelius to say Angela is wrong. Yet,
given Angela’s perspective, wasn’t it correct to say what she did? After
all, when I say It might be that P and it might be that not P, knowing
that Cornelius knows whether P, I do not naturally think that Cornelius
knows that I said something false. There is a real puzzle here, I think,
but this is not the place to pursue it further.
MacFarlane []:
() a. Sally: Joe might be in Boston.
b. George: He can’t be in Boston. I saw him in the hall ﬁve minutes ago.
c. (i) Sally: Oh, then I guess I was wrong.
(ii) Sally: Oh, OK. So he can’t be in Boston. Nonethless, when I said
“Joe might be in Boston,” what I said was true, and I stand by
that claim.
On a solipsistic understanding, (-a) would be true iﬀ Joe being in Boston is com-
patible with what Sally knows at the time of utterance. Finding out later that Joe isn’t
in Boston can’t change that. But then what she says in (-c-i) is surprising, and we
should expect that (-c-ii) should be a ﬁne thing to say.
An immediately obvious response would be to say that George’s knowledge counts
too because as Sally’s addressee he is part of the relevant group whose knowledge
counts. But against this, MacFarlane presents this variant:
() a. Sally: Joe might be in Boston.
b. George: Oh, really? I didn’t know that.
c. (i) Jane (overhearing and not party to the conversation): Sally is
wrong. I saw Joe just a few minutes ago.
(ii) Jane (overhearing and not party to the conversation): Joe can’t be
in Boston. I saw him just a few minutes ago. Nonetheless, what
Sally said is true.
On a more complex, but still subjective/contextualist semantics, (-c-i) would be
unexpected, and (-c-ii) should be a ﬁne thing to say, contrary to fact, or so the
relativists claim.
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. CIA Theories
The remedy recommended by MacFarlane [] and Egan et al. [], see also Egan []:
semantic interpretation is relative not just to a context of utterance and an index
of evaluation but also a context of assessment. That is, we need a triple-indexed
semantics.
() A-R M  ‘’
Jmight φKc,i,a =  iﬀ ∃w0 ∈ fa : JφKc,<w0,ti>,a = .
where fa is the set of worlds compatible with what the assessor knows at the
time of the assessment.
Note: we are glossing over details of implementation that diﬀer among the
various relativist proposals. But () is the core of the relativist idea.
So, what goes on in a sequence like
() Sally: Joe might be in Boston.
Jane (hidden in the bushes): Sally is wrong. I saw Joe just a few minutes ago.
is that when Jane is assessing the truth of Sally’s statement, the modal base automati-
cally shifts to Jane’s knowledge base, because might is assessment-sensitive.
[Note: a similar semantics has recently been proposed by Lasersohn [] for predicates
of personal taste. We can’t comment on his analysis here, but suspect that a non-
relativistic semantics may also work for his cases.]
. Trouble in Relativity Town, or Down with the CIA!
. We have some worries about the central “I was wrong” kind of data. It needs
to be carefully argued that this really assesses the truth-value of the original
statement. An obvious alternative diagnosis might be that Sally is admitting
that she was wrong to consider it possible that Joe was in Boston, i.e. that her
cognitive state wasn’t what it should have been – which would still leave her
original statement as a true description of her cognitive state as it was. ...We
propose to suspend our disbelief for the remainder of this talk and proceed as
if the data are as claimed by the relativists.
. Another worry is that the assessment-sensitive semantics seems to wreak havoc
with the standard picture of communication as developed by Stalnaker [],
where propositions are at the center of the notion of dialogue. It is unclear
what will happen to that picture when we have assessment-sensitive sentences
– but see Macfarlane [] and Egan [] for some ideas, which we are quite
skeptical about. Again, we will suspend our disbelief.
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. Having said that, we do want to present some troublesome data. Consider this
dialogue:
() a. Kai: I am looking for my keys.
b. Thony: Might they be in your desk?
Why would Thony ask what he asks if the truth-value of The keys might be in
Kai’s desk for him entirely depends on his (the assessor’s) knowledge state.
. We have actually already two instances of a kind of example that seems very
problematic for the relativists:
() It’s possible it will be a boy, it’s possible it will be a girl. Should I buy
blue or pink? [from Teller]
() “After all, when I say It might be that P and it might be that not P,
knowing that Cornelius knows whether P, I do not naturally think
that Cornelius knows that I said something false.” [Hawthorne]
Or consider Sally:
() Joe might be in Boston and he might be in New York. I just don’t
know.
She would not say “I was wrong” when she ﬁnds out that Joe is in Boston, even
though her statement entailed that Joe might be in New York, which according
to the relativists is false from her new state of evidence.
Similarly, therelativistspredictthatanassessorwhoknowswhereJoeis(inNew
York, say) would ﬁnd Sally’s utterance false, which seems an absurd prediction
to us.
A quantiﬁcational variant
() There are many places the keys might be.
should be – but clearly isn’t – a statement doomed to quick failure as soon as
the assessor knows where the keys are or even ﬁgures out that there are only
two places that they could be.
 It is often more natural to give lists of epistemic possibilities by using the connective or. But this does
not aﬀect the point made here. The sentence Joe might be in Boston or he might be in New York clearly
entails that Joe might be in Boston. Why that entailment holds is a puzzle addressed in quite a bit of
recent work on the interaction of disjunction and modality.
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 The Revised Extended Standard Theory
Our main point: once we allow for the ﬂexibility of the relevant group whose dis-
tributed knowledge underlies a might-claim, we can explain the new data presented
by the relativists. At the same time, we don’t have the conceptual troubles they have
and we don’t have a problem with the data we just presented. In other words, the
relativistic analyses are not only problematic but also unnecessary.
The main point we need to address, we feel, is the case of eaves-dropping, repeated
here:
() a. Sally: Joe might be in Boston.
b. George: Oh, really? I didn’t know that.
c. (i) Jane (overhearing and not party to the conversation): Sally is
wrong. I saw Joe just a few minutes ago.
(ii) Jane (overhearing and not party to the conversation): Joe can’t be
in Boston. I saw him just a few minutes ago. Nonetheless, what
Sally said is true.
We claim that Jane can be seen as part of the community with respect to which Sally’s
utterance is evaluated, without having to resort to an assessment-sensitive semantics.
When the interpretation of a sentence is sensitive to how the context resolves an
indeterminacy in its logical form – and if the speaker chooses not to reduce the
indeterminacy –, the speaker exposes themselves to challenges. As we have seen,
epistemic modals need as one contextual parameter the group G whose knowledge is
relevant to the epistemic claim. Unless there is a very speciﬁc in view of phrase or very
strong contextual clues, there will be indeterminacy, that is there will be a non-trivial
set of possible values of G. In such a case, the speaker is responsible for the fact that
their statement could be interpreted with respect to a group G that is much bigger –
and thus makes the statement much stronger – than it would be under a solipsistic
interpretation or even under an interpretation where the speaker and the addressee
are the only relevant members of G.
In general, we would like to model contextual indeterminacy by saying that there is a
set C of admissible contexts. Roughly speaking, C contains those contexts which the
speaker should reasonably expect to be possible contexts with respect to which the
utterance might be evaluated. What distinguishes items like epistemic modals from
items like the indexical I is that all of the admissible contexts will have the speaker
be the referent of I, while admissible contexts may vary quite a bit as to the value the
group G parameter.
 We owe the germ of this idea to a comment made by Angelika Kratzer when Kai von Fintel gave a
colloquium about epistemic modals and conditionals at UMass on December , .
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The behavior of epistemic modals is found with other “contextually restricted” quan-
tiﬁcational expressions as well, but with illuminating diﬀerences:
() Sally: Every student was at the meeting.
George: What, even those that are on leave in Nicaragua?
Sally: No, what I meant was every student in residence.
In (), Sally retreats to a more speciﬁc resolution of her initial statement. This kind
of retreat seems unnatural with might:
() (continuing the dialogue in ()):
Sally: Well, what I meant was that given what I knew then, Joe might be in
Boston.
The explanation is straightforward: Sally’s prior epistemic state is of little interest
once George’s information is revealed.
The speaker’s responsibility should not reach beyond a reasonable cloud of contexts:
() Detective Parker is reading court transcripts from the s where Capone is on
the stand being asked about where some money is in relation to a particular safe
...
Capone: The money might be in the safe.
Parker: ??Al was wrong/That’s false. The safe was opened in  and found
to be empty.
It is hard to imagine a sense in which Capone and Parker form a relevant community
whose knowledge Capone’s statement could be sensitive to. In contrast, we argue
that the “stranger in the bushes” scenario in () is one where Sally’s utterance is
transported into a context that she may well not have anticipated, but where it could
still be felt that Jane-in-the-bushes and Sally are engaged in the same “investigation”
and that therefore there is an admissible context assigning to the modal the evidence
shared between Sally and Jane.
The crucial point of our analysis is that when faced with indeterminacy it is a mistake
to assume that “the context” will resolve the indeterminacy. Instead, participants
in a conversation need to take into account a cloud of admissible contexts within
which their conversation is situated. We anticipate that our analysis may also serve
as an alternative to other proposed applications of MacFarlane’s notion of assessment
relativity, for example the contextual relativity of knowledge attributions [].
 Actually, it doesn’t sound so odd for Sally to demur: “Look, I said ‘might be’ – I didn’t claim that he was
deﬁnitely in Boston.” But we had agreed not to challenge the relativistic view of the data too much.
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 The Dynamic Future
Some issues that we probably don’t have time to talk about today but will address in
our paper:
• What about epistemic must? Does it also refer to the distributed knowledge
of the relevant group? Note that if so, the resolution of G that makes a must-
statement strongest is the solipsistic one.
• Our “objective”, non-solipsistic analysis of many might-statements entails that
often speakers who assert these statements cannot possibly know whether they
are true, since that depends on what other people know. So, when Thony says:
() The keys might be in your desk.
his statement depends on what I know, something he can’t fully know. This is
a problem if for a speaker to assert a sentence correctly, they should believe that
the sentence is true. Thony can’t really be in such a position. Our guess: the
proper view is that non-solipsistic might-statements are more like conjectures
and as such are not subject to the belief-condition.
• Embedding of epistemic modals raises many interesting issues. We suspect
that the relativistic analyses have not much to oﬀer here. We do anticipate that
the behavior of the G-parameter is peculiar in that it does not behave like a
run-of-the-mill indexical. In fact, one possibility is that instead of the we-type
meaning we’ve been assuming, the G-parameter behaves more like the “generic
pronoun” one discussed by Moltmann [] and Saﬁr [], among others.
• Epistemic modals have been one of the show-pieces of dynamic semantics and
we intend to investigate how our proposal could be integrated into a dynamic
semantics or into a formal theory of discourse dynamics.
So, stay tuned – and please send us any comments you might have.
 Keshet [] in fact explores such an analysis for the taste predicates for which Lasersohn had presented a
relativistic account.
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